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We have investigated the meteorology and oceanography (METOC) aspects of 
operational risk management (ORM), safety, and readiness in Naval afloat operations.  
The purpose of this work was to identify and develop methods by which the METOC 
community can better contribute to these components of Naval operations.  Records of 
class A, B and C afloat mishaps during March 1997 – March 2002 from the Naval Safety 
Center (NSC) were the primary data source for this study.  Our major objectives in 
analyzing this data were to identify: (1) METOC related mishaps (MRMs); (2) the costs 
of these mishaps; and (3) the phenomenological and operational conditions under which 
these mishaps occurred 
We identified 166 MRMs during the study period.  The major average costs of 
these mishaps were: (1) 1.5 deaths per year; (2) 16 days of lost duty per MRM; (3) 11 
days of light duty per MRM; (4) 150 days of lost or light duty per year due to MRMs 
involving small boat operations; and (5) $54,000 in equipment damage per MRM.  The 
major METOC phenomena involved in underway MRMs were high winds and seas, 
which occurred in over half the MRMs.  Rain was the major phenomenon involved in 
privately operated vehicle (POV) mishaps.  84% of the MRMs involved some type of 
deficiency in training on how to deal with adverse METOC conditions.  For most MRMs, 
the mishap records did not provide enough information to determine if a METOC 
forecast and/or brief was provided prior to the mishap.  During 1997 – 2001 there was a 
declining trend in tropical cyclone (TC) related mishaps, especially in the western 
Pacific.  Preliminary analyses suggest this trend may be an indication of improvements in 
TC forecasting, and therefore a potential metric of increased METOC contributions to 
afloat ORM, safety, and readiness. 
One of the products of this study is a training module on operating small boats 
under various wind and sea states.  We identified the need for this module from our 
analyses of the MRMs, and from consulting with colleagues at NSC, North Atlantic 
Meteorology and Oceanography Center (NLMOC), Surface Warfare Officer School 
(SWOS), Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic (EWTGLANT), and Marine 
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Rescue Consultants.  Upon completion, this module will be distributed to the fleet 
through the SWOS Department Head Training program.  We expect this module to be 
useful in homeland security and Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG) operations by 
contributing to improved ORM, safety, and readiness associated with boarding, 
searching, and seizure operations.  Another product, our MRM database, has been 
transferred to NLMOC where it has been used in a separate study of the effectiveness of 
Optimal Track Ship Routing (OTSR).  Based on our findings, we have developed a set of 
recommendations for how the METOC community can better meet its afloat customers’ 
needs, and thereby increase the overall METOC contribution to real world operations.  
We will submit to NSC our recommendations on how to improve the METOC aspects of 
investigating and reporting afloat mishaps. 
The major accomplishments of this study are: (1) the development of a database 
of METOC related mishaps that can be used for future studies; (2) the development of 
recommendations for the METOC, Afloat, and Safety communities; (3) the initial 
development of risk management, safety, and readiness metrics for the METOC 
community; (4) the development of a baseline data set for quantifying future 
contributions of METOC community; and (5) the identification of the need for, and the 
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Class A Mishap:  A mishap in which the total cost of reportable damage is $1 million or 
more; or any injury or work-related illness resulting in death or permanent total disability.  
 
Class B Mishap:  A mishap in which the total cost of reportable property damage is 
$200,000 or more, but less than $1 million; an injury or work-related illness resulting in 
permanent partial disability; or a mishap resulting in the hospitalization of three or more 
people.  
 Class C Mishap:  A mishap in which the total cost of reportable property damage is 
$20,000 or more, but less than $200,000; or an injury or disability preventing personnel 
from performing regularly scheduled duty for 5 days (1 day for embarked Marines) or 
more after 2359 hours on the day of the injury or onset of illness. 
 
Evolution:  A movement, or a series of movements, of troops or ships, as for disposition 
in order of battle or in line on parade.  An event or operation. 
 
Light Duty Day:  Any day that a crewmember has an injury or a disability that prevents 
him/her from performing regularly scheduled duty, but he/she is still are on the job in a 
diminished capacity. 
 
Lost Duty Day:  Any day that a crewmember has an injury or a disability that prevents 
him/her from being on the job. 
 
Mishap Investigation Board (MIB):  For all afloat Class A mishaps the immediate 
superior in command, or other higher authority, appoints a MIB.  The board’s purpose is 
to investigate the mishap to determine the causes.  The board then prepares a Mishap 
Investigation Report (MIR) with its findings, conclusions, or recommendations. 
 
Mishap Investigation Report (MIR):  A formal investigation report for all Class A afloat 
mishaps that contains the findings, conclusions, or recommendations from a Mishap 
Investigation Board. 
 
Mishap Report (MR):  A report that analyzes and assesses the cause of a mishap.  Causes 
fall into four categories: human, procedural, equipment/material, and design factors.  
Commanding officers are encouraged to submit a MR with lessons for otherwise non-
reportable mishaps that could benefit other ships, such as for minor mishaps or near 
mishaps.  Design or material defects that caused a mishap should be highlighted.  
 
METOC Affected Operations:  Fleet activities that are directly affected by METOC 
phenomena and/or METOC operations, such as: war fighting operations (aviation, 
amphib, ISR, etc.); the design and use of communication, navigation, and weapons 
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systems; operation of motor vehicles; mission planning and ORM; education and 
training; etc. 
 METOC Operations:  The activities of the METOC community, such as monitoring, 
analyzing, and forecasting METOC phenomena; providing METOC briefs and other 
products and services to fleet customers; etc. 
   
METOC Phenomena:  Atmospheric and oceanographic conditions, such as wind, clouds, 
rain, haze, etc. 
 METOC Related Human Safety Factor:  A deficiency in the efforts of individuals or 
groups of people to contend with METOC risks.  METOC related human safety factors 
create hazardous conditions and may cause mishaps. 
METOC Related Mishap (MRM):  A mishap in which one or more of the following 
contributed to the mishap: 
a. METOC phenomena 
b. deficiencies in METOC operations, including deficiencies in the creation 
and dissemination of METOC products and services 
c.  deficiencies in the use of METOC products and services to assess and 
manage METOC risks 
d. deficiencies in education and training on assessing and managing METOC 
risks 
 
METOC Related Operational Risk Management (MRORM): The same process as 
conducted for ORM, but with a special emphasis being given to hazardous METOC 
phenomena, METOC operations, and METOC affected operations. 
 
METOC Risks:  Risks created by METOC phenomena that have the potential to interfere 
with successful and safe completion of an operation.  Also known as METOC Hazards or 
METOC Risk Factors 
 
Operational Risk Management (ORM):  ORM is a process in which people at all levels 
increase their operational effectiveness by: 
a. anticipating hazards 
b. identifying and implementing methods for reducing the risks imposed by 
those hazards 
The goal of ORM is to increase the probability of a successful mission by anticipating 
and managing all the risks involved in that mission.  ORM involves a five step process: 
a. Identify Hazards  
b. Assess Hazards  
c. Make Risk Decisions  
d. Implement Controls  
e. Supervise 




Practical Man Test (PMT):  A method for determining whether a mishap was a MRM.  
The three possible answers for any mishap are: Yes, No, Maybe.  For this study, the PMT 
was conducted by an experienced Naval officer who is, or has been: a Surface Warfare 
Officer, a METOC Officer, and an Afloat Safety Officer.  Many of the PMT outcomes of 
this study were checked and confirmed by other Naval officers with comparable 
experience. 
 
Readiness:  A state of preparedness in which ship or organization is capable of 
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We have investigated the meteorology and oceanography (METOC) aspects of 
operational risk management (ORM), safety, and readiness in Naval afloat operations.  
The purpose of this work was to identify and develop methods by which the METOC 
community can better contribute to these components of Naval operations.  Records of 
class A, B and C afloat mishaps during March 1997 – March 2002 from the Naval Safety 
Center (NSC) were the primary data source for this study.  Our major objectives in 
analyzing this data were to identify: (1) METOC related mishaps (MRMs); (2) the costs 
of these mishaps; and (3) the phenomenological and operational conditions under which 
these mishaps occurred. 
We identified 166 MRMs during the study period.  The major average costs of 
these mishaps were: (1) 1.5 deaths per year; (2) 16 days of lost duty per MRM; (3) 11 
days of light duty per MRM; (4) 150 days of lost or light duty per year due to MRMs 
involving small boat operations; and (5) $54,000 in equipment damage per MRM.  The 
major METOC phenomena involved in underway MRMs were high winds and seas, 
which occurred in over half the MRMs.  Rain was the major phenomenon involved in 
privately operated vehicle (POV) mishaps.  84% of the MRMs involved some type of 
deficiency in training on how to deal with adverse METOC conditions.  For most MRMs, 
the mishap records did not provide enough information to determine if a METOC 
forecast and/or brief was provided prior to the mishap.  During 1997 – 2001 there was a 
declining trend in tropical cyclone (TC) related mishaps, especially in the western 
Pacific.  Preliminary analyses suggest this trend may be an indication of improvements in 
TC forecasting, and therefore a potential metric of increased METOC contributions to 
afloat ORM, safety, and readiness. 
One of the products of this study is a training module on operating small boats 
under various wind and sea states.  We identified the need for this module from our 
analyses of the MRMs, and from consulting with colleagues at NSC, North Atlantic 
Meteorology and Oceanography Center (NLMOC), Surface Warfare Officer School 
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(SWOS), Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic (EWTGLANT), and Marine 
Rescue Consultants.  Upon completion, this module will be distributed to the fleet 
through the SWOS Department Head Training program.  We expect this module to be 
useful in homeland security and Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG) operations by 
contributing to improved ORM, safety, and readiness associated with boarding, 
searching, and seizure operations.  Another product, our MRM database, has been 
transferred to NLMOC where it has been used in a separate study of the effectiveness of 
Optimal Track Ship Routing (OTSR).  Based on our findings, we have developed a set of 
recommendations for how the METOC community can better meet its afloat customers’ 
needs, and thereby increase the overall METOC contribution to real world operations.  
We will submit to NSC our recommendations on how to improve the METOC aspects of 
investigating and reporting afloat mishaps. 
The major accomplishments of this study are: (1) the development of a database 
of METOC related mishaps that can be used for future studies; (2) the development of 
recommendations for the METOC, Afloat, and Safety communities; (3) the initial 
development of risk management, safety, and readiness metrics for the METOC 
community; (4) the development of a baseline data set for quantifying future 
contributions of METOC community; and (5) the identification of the need for, and the 
development of, a METOC related training module for the Afloat community. 
 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION   
A. OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
The U.S. Navy operates in hazardous atmospheric and oceanic environments.  
These hazards can lead to significant losses of lives, health, equipment, and readiness.  A 
number of major losses to the Navy have been the direct results of hazardous METOC 
phenomena.  One of the best-known historical cases is one in which a battle group 
commanded by Admiral W. Halsey encountered a typhoon near the Philippines in 
December 1944.  The high winds and seas generated by the typhoon directly led to the 
sinking of three ships, the loss of almost 100 aircraft, and the deaths of nearly 800 men 
(Morison 1947).  During the mishap investigation that followed, Halsey stated that the 
METOC information available from Fleet Weather Central in Pearl Harbor was not 
sufficiently specific and timely to allow him to make the appropriate decisions (Saliba 
2002).  But others maintained that weather reconnaissance and forecasts provided 
adequate warnings that Halsey failed to heed in time (Bryson 2000, Saliba 2002).  Still 
others have stated that many of the losses could be attributed to poor procedures for 
dealing with an approaching tropical cyclone (TC) and/or failure to follow appropriate 
procedures (Morison 1947). 
Many improvements have been made since World War II in understanding and 
forecasting hazardous METOC phenomena, and in developing safer procedures for 
dealing with these hazards.  But the Navy continues to suffer many METOC related 
mishaps (MRMs).  The direct costs of these mishaps are significant and include lost: (1) 
lives; (2) labor; (3) equipment; and (4) dollars.  The indirect costs include: (1) loss of 
readiness; (2) investigation costs; (3) litigation costs; (4) damage to the fleet’s reputation; 
and (5) damage to the METOC community’s reputation 
This study is an attempt to identify Naval afloat MRMs, their costs, and the 
circumstances under which they occurred.  The purpose of this study is to identify ways 
in which the Naval METOC community can better contribute to operational risk 
assessment, risk management, safety, and readiness.  Our hope is that by doing so, the 
number and the cost of afloat mishaps can be reduced.  
2 
B. OVERVIEW OF NAVAL SAFETY POLICIES  
When a mishap occurs in the fleet, a mishap investigation is conducted and a 
report is prepared as part of the Navy’s effort to reduce the number and severity of 
mishaps.  The Naval Safety Center (NSC) in Norfolk, VA, oversees the procedures for 
preparing mishap reports, and for analyzing and archiving them.  The goal of the Naval 
Safety Center (NSC), as stated by Naval Occupational Safety And Health (NAVOSH) 
Program Manual For Forces Afloat (Dept. of Navy 2001a), is to enhance operational 
readiness and mission accomplishment by establishing an aggressive safety and 
occupational health (SOH) program that will reduce occupational injuries, illnesses or 
deaths, and material loss or damage, and to maintain safe and healthy working conditions 
for personnel.  The safety aspects of the program address the elimination or control of 
hazards that can result in immediate injury or death.  The occupational aspects are 
primarily concerned with the identification and elimination, where possible, of adverse 
health effects of hazardous chemicals, physical, and biological agents.      
The NSC maintains an afloat mishap database that includes narrative and 
statistical summaries of all Naval afloat mishaps.  The causes of Naval afloat mishaps are 
documented in mishap investigation reports (MIRs) and mishap reports (MRs).  These 
reports describe the basic circumstances of the mishap (i.e., the who, what, where, when, 
and why of the mishap), and provide damage assessments and a description of the 
effectiveness of the measures used to limit further damage after the mishap occurred.  
The entire mishap investigation effort is focused on preventing future mishaps. 
The causes of mishaps are grouped into four categories: material factors, 
procedural factors, human factors, and design factors.  Material factors consider all 
material failures and malfunctions, including whether the failures or malfunctions 
occurred because of normal or abnormal means.  This category includes failure due to 
improper repair or normal wear and tear.  Material factors are broken down into the 
following categories: (1) unauthorized; (2) safeties or guards failed; (3) inappropriate for 
use; (4) installation or repair faulty; (5) condition defective; and (6) normal wear and tear. 
Procedural factors consider the possible effects of policies, regulations, 
operations, and processes from all levels in the chain of command.  Factors that are 
3 
considered include policies published by higher authorities, such as preventive 
maintenance schedules (PMS), technical manuals, Naval warfare publications (NWPs), 
Navy tactical publications (NTPs), U.S. Diving Manual, operational orders (OPORDs), 
ordnance publications (OPs), the Safe Engineering and Operation of LCAC (SEAOPS) 
Manual, and the commanding officer’s standing orders.  Procedural factors are broken 
down into the following categories: (1) too complex; (2) not available; (3) incorrect. 
Human factors (personnel errors) account for human involvement in the events 
leading up to a mishap, actions taken as the mishap is occurring, and actions taken after 
the mishap occurred.  Human factors are broken down into the following categories: (1) 
unsafe acts; (2) unsafe supervision; (3) unsafe crew conditions; and (4) organizational 
influence.  Many mishaps reports list personnel error, a type of human factor, as the 
causal factor. 
Design factors consider whether a design defect caused the mishap.  Design 
factors can be broken down into the following categories: (1) hazard to personnel; (2) 
hazard to equipment; and (3) maintainability.  
The afloat safety bible does not explicitly discuss whether METOC phenomena 
can be considered causal factors in afloat mishaps.  However, the afloat policy on this  
issue may be inferred from Naval aviation safety policy that states that the causes of 
mishaps are factors over which humans have control (Dept. of Navy 2001b).  Therefore, 
METOC phenomena, which are conditions over which humans have no control (e.g., 
temperature, sea state, winds), are not considered to be causal factors.  However, 
METOC operations and METOC affected operations may be causal factors.  For 
example, an inadequate weather forecast or improper weather avoidance procedures 
might be causal factors in a mishap, but the METOC phenomena that occurred prior to or 
during the mishap (e.g., high winds and seas) would not be causal factors, according to 
Naval safety policies (Dept. of Navy 2001b). 
Although METOC phenomena are not considered causal factors, they can still be 
regarded as contributing factors.  However, in afloat MIRs and MRs the descriptions of 
METOC phenomena are generally very limited (e.g., a brief narrative statement from the 
ship’s Safety Officer stating simply “high winds and seas”). There is no consistent and 
4 
readily identified information in afloat MIRs and MRs that can be used to quickly 
determine which afloat mishaps were METOC related mishaps.  In most MIRs and MRs, 
even those that involved hazardous METOC phenomena, very little METOC data is 
provided and little attention is given to how the phenomena might have contributed to a 
mishap.  Even less attention is given to how METOC operations or METOC affected 
operations might have contributed to the mishap.  As a result, for most afloat mishaps, the 
extent to which METOC phenomena and operations contributed to the mishaps is not 
immediately apparent from examining the MIRs and MRs. 
C. METOC ROLE IN OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT, SAFETY, 
AND READINESS 
Operational risk management (ORM) is a process used by the Navy to increase 
the probability of a successful mission by anticipating and managing all the risks 
involved in that mission.  In ORM, people at all levels increase their operational 
effectiveness by anticipating hazards and identifying and implementing methods for 
reducing the risk imposed by those hazards.  ORM involves a five-step process: (1) 
identify hazards; (2) assess hazards; (3) make decisions to mitigate hazards; (4) 
implement risk reduction procedures; (5) supervise risk reduction procedures.  METOC 
related ORM (MRORM) is similar to ORM but with an emphasis on hazardous METOC 
phenomena, and the development and implementation of appropriate METOC operations 
and METOC affected operations for mitigating those hazards.  Examples of steps in 
METOC related ORM include identifying and forecasting approaching storms at sea, 
developing procedures for communicating METOC information to ship drivers, 
developing procedures for evading storms, and training operators on how to safely 
operate vessels under adverse METOC conditions.  The overall consequences of failing 
to properly anticipate and prepare for METOC related hazards are shown in Figure 1.  
This figure illustrates how deficiencies in METOC products and services, in assessing 
METOC risks, and/or in managing METOC risks can lead to mishaps.  Mishaps can then 
lead to a loss of readiness and thereby make an organization incapable of conducting its 
mission. 
D. REVIEW OF PRIOR STUDIES  
This study on the METOC aspects of Naval afloat risk management, safety, and 
readiness follows a comparable study conducted by Cantu (2001) on the role of weather 
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in Naval aviation mishaps.  The Cantu study is one of only a very few that directly 
address the METOC aspects of Naval aviation safety (cf. Cantu 2001).  As far as we were 
able to determine, no prior studies of the METOC aspects of afloat safety have been 
done.  Our discussions with a number of people who have been or are involved in 
military and civilian afloat safety turned up no other studies comparable to this one.  
These discussions include communications with personnel at NSC (S. Scudder, 2002, 
personal communication), in the merchant marine industry (M. Diehl, 2002, personal 
communication), in the Coast Guard (A. Marsilio and D. Venne, 2002, personal 
communication), at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute (H. Kite-Powell, 2002, personal 
communication), in the II Marine Expedition Force Headquarters (R. Nichols, 2002, 
personal communication), and at Optimum Track Ship Routing, North Atlantic Naval 
Meteorology and Oceanography Center (NLMOC, P. Dixon and S. Bingham, 2002, 
personal communication).  All of these people stated that they did not know of any prior 
studies of the METOC aspects of afloat safety.   
E. MOTIVATIONS FOR STUDY 
Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, stated in an All Navy message 
on 26 November 2002 (Clark 2002): “The success of Naval operations is based upon a 
willingness to balance risk and taking the bold, decisive action necessary to triumph in 
battle.  At the same time, commanders have a fundamental responsibility to safeguard 
highly valued personnel and material resources, and to accept only the minimal level of 
risk necessary to accomplish mission.”  We hope that this study will assist in the Navy’s 
risk management, safety, and readiness efforts.  This study was prompted by the Cantu 
(2001) study, and by an office call with the Oceanographer of the Navy in September 
2001 in which the Oceanographer, RADM R. West, stated that he thought an afloat study 
comparable to LCDR Cantu’s needed to be done (R. West, 2001, personal 
communication). 
F. OUTLINE OF THIS STUDY 
In this study, we have analyzed NSC mishap records to identify: (1) METOC 
related mishaps (MRMs); (2) the costs of these mishaps; and (3) the phenomenological 
and operational conditions under which these mishaps occurred.  We define a MRM as a 
mishap in which one or more of the following occurred: 
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1. Meteorological and/or oceanographic phenomena significantly increased 
operational risks.  Examples of phenomena include: 
a. high winds or seas 
b. rain 
c. snow and ice 
d. tides and currents. 
2. METOC related operational deficiencies increased the risk to operators.  
Examples of operational deficiencies: 
a. breakdown in METOC related ORM process 
b. lack of real time forecast 
c. lack of MET team and/or brief 
d. breakdown in communication between METOC and Afloat 
personnel 
e. lack of training, understanding, and/or competence 
Our overall goals for this study were to identify methods for: (1) improving 
METOC related operational risk management; (2) improving safety; (3) increasing fleet 
readiness; (4) improving METOC products and services for war fighters; and (5) 
increasing the contributions of the METOC community to the fleet. 
The major milestones for this study were: 
1. Develop a database of MRMs. 
2. Take initial steps for developing risk management, safety, & readiness 
metrics for METOC community. 
3. Develop recommendations for METOC, Afloat, and Safety communities. 
4. Develop baseline data set for quantifying future contributions of METOC 
community.  
5. Identify and begin developing METOC related training modules for afloat 
community. 
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II. DATA AND METHODS 
A. DATA 
Our primary data sources were approximately 8000 afloat MIRs and MRs from 
NSC for the period March 1997 – March 2002.  To understand this data, it is important to 
understand the process the Navy uses in investigating and reporting afloat mishaps. 
1. Afloat Safety Bible 
The primary afloat mishap document is Navy Occupational Safety and Health 
(NAVOSH) Program Manual For Forces Afloat (Dept. of Navy 2001a), which is often 
referred to as the “afloat safety bible.”  The purpose of this document is to provide 
commanding officers, safety officers, managers, supervisors, and workers for afloat 
commands with the guidance and direction necessary to implement the NAVOSH 
program.  In the remainder of this section, several sections of this document are excerpted 
and discussed in order to clarify the nature of the data sources for this study.  In 
particular, the contents of Tables 1, 2, and 3 are direct quotes from Dept. of Navy 
(2001a). 
 
Table 1.   Ships to Which the Navy Safety Bible Applies 
(1) Commissioned, U.S. Navy ships and their embarked equipment, boats, and landing 
craft, floating dry docks, or leased boats. 
(2) Pre-commissioned, U.S. Navy ships and their embarked equipment, boats, and 
landing craft, or leased boats beginning when the ship gets underway for Acceptance 
Trials. 
(3) USNS ships manned by Federal civilian mariners assigned to ships in the Military 
Sealift Command (MSC). 





Table 2.   Mishaps for Which Shipboard Mishap Investigation And Reporting Procedures 
Apply 
 
Shipboard reporting procedures apply to those mishaps in which there was: 
(1) Damage to the ships and the ships' embarked equipment and craft listed above at all times, 
both underway and moored. 
(2) Death or injury to all personnel (including embarked personnel) aboard ships or craft listed 
above while underway. 
(3) Death or injury to ship's or embarked craft's military and Federal civilian mariner crew 
members (permanent or under temporary orders) when moored and when on-duty ashore 
 
Table 3.   Categories of Reportable Afloat Mishaps 
 
(a) Class A Mishap. Total cost of reportable damage is $1,000,000 or more; or any injury or 
work-related illness resulting in death or permanent total disability 
(b) Class B Mishap. The total cost of reportable property damage is $200,000 or more, but less 
than $1,000,000; an injury or work-related illness resulting in permanent partial disability; or a 
mishap resulting in the hospitalization of three or more people. 
(c) Class C Mishap. The resulting total cost of reportable property damage is $20,000 or more, 
but less than $200,000; or an injury or disability preventing personnel from performing regularly 
scheduled duty for 5 days (1 day for embarked Marines) or more after 2359 on the day of injury 
or onset of illness. 
(d) Afloat Special Case Mishap. The following special case afloat mishaps require the submission 
of an MR: 
1.  All cases of electric shock. Include the voltage in the report. 
2.  All cases of grounding, collision, and flooding. 
3.  All fires. 
4. All cases of hazardous material, chemical or toxic exposure requiring medical attention. 
5. All mishaps involving explosives, oxidizers, incendiaries, explosive systems or chemical 
warfare agents. Mishaps include detonation, accidental launch, malfunction, dangerous defect, 
improper handling, damage to a launching device, weapon impact off range, or other unusual or 
unexpected weapons-related occurrence. 
6.  All diving cases involving central nervous system (CNS) oxygen toxicity, pulmonary over 
inflation syndrome (POIS) or hyperbaric treatment. 
7.  All cases of back injury resulting from a mishap requiring medical attention. 
8. All cases involving nuclear weapons, nuclear propulsion plants, or radioactive materials 
involved in these systems. However, mishaps associated with the secondary side of the ship's 
nuclear propulsion plant or non-nuclear components are reportable. 
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2. Mishap Investigation and Reporting Procedures 
When a Class A, B, or C Naval afloat mishap occurs, the severity of the mishap 
dictates the investigation and reporting procedure.  NSC appoints a trained mishap 
investigation advisor for all afloat Class A mishaps, and provides an advisor for other 
mishaps when a trained investigator would be beneficial to the investigation (Dept. of 
Navy 2001).  For Class B and C mishaps, a mishap Report (MR) is used.  This type of 
report provides an assessment as to what caused the mishap (material, human, procedural, 
and/or design factors).  This report is submitted to the Naval Safety Center within 30 days 
by the command under the following circumstances:  
1. Class B mishaps occurring on board ship that are not investigated by an 
MIB and reported in an MIR.  
2. Reportable Class C mishaps occurring on board ship, to the ship’s (and 
embarked unit’s and detachment’s) on-duty personnel ashore, or involving 
damage to the ship’s equipment located ashore.  
3. Afloat special case mishaps occurring on board ship or to the ship’s (and 
embarked units and detachments) on-duty personnel ashore.  
4. Class A or B mishaps occurring to the ship’s (embarked unit’s and 
detachment’s) on-duty personnel while ashore or involving damage to the 
ship’s equipment located ashore.   
Commanding officers are encouraged to submit a MR with lessons learned for 
non-reportable mishaps, near mishaps, or design or material defects that could lead to 
mishaps.  
For Class A mishaps, the reporting procedure is more detailed.  The Immediate 
Superior In Command (ISIC), or other higher authority, appoints a mishap investigation 
board (MIB) for all afloat Class A mishaps.  All MIBs consist of a senior member and at 
least two additional members.  The board’s purpose is to investigate the mishap and 
determine the causes.  The board prepares a Mishap Investigation Report (MIR) with its 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations (Dept. of Navy 2001).  
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The senior member of the MIB has to be an unrestricted line officer in the U.S. 
Navy or U.S. Marine Corps, or a senior official in Military Sealift Command (MSC).  
The senior member should be senior to the commanding officer of the command involved 
in the mishap.  If junior to the commanding officer, the senior member will be from 
another command.  In addition to the senior member, the appointing authority will 
appoint a minimum of two commissioned officers to the MIB.  If a Marine or Marine 
equipment is involved in the mishap, the appointing authority should appoint a U.S. 
Marine Corps officer as a member of the MIB.  In all cases involving death or injury, the 
appointing authority includes a medical officer, or medical department representative for 
LCACs, as an additional member to the MIB.  
The ISIC and the commanding officer of the unit involved coordinate the time 
and location of the initial meeting of the MIB.  The ISIC provides the convening date and 
location to the operational chain of command and NSC as soon as possible.  The ISIC or 
the commanding officer of the unit involved provides the accommodations, local 
transportation, and administrative support.  The senior member of the MIB has the 
authority to release messages specifically related to the mishap investigation and the 
MIR.  
The MIB conducts its investigation of the mishap separately from all other 
investigations.  Members of the board cannot release information revealing the source of 
any physical evidence obtained as a result of privileged information (see next section) or 
any testimony given under the assurance of privilege.  Board members are required to 
cooperate with each other and provide access to non-privileged physical evidence and 
witnesses.  
3. Concept of Privilege 
Two important parts of the NAVOSH program (Dept. of Navy 2001) are: (1) the 
protection of people who fully cooperate with in a mishap investigation from any kind of 
negative consequences for providing that information; and (2) the concept of privileged 
information.  Individuals providing information to mishap investigators under a promise 
of confidentiality are advised that the Navy will use its best efforts to ensure that the 
information is not released to any other agency or individual.  The concept of privilege is 
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that information designated as privileged cannot be used as evidence for disciplinary 
action, and those participating are assured confidentiality.    
The purpose of designating information as privileged is to overcome any 
reluctance of an individual to reveal complete and candid information about the events 
surrounding the mishap and to encourage mishap investigators and the endorsers of MIRs 
to provide complete, open, and forthright information, opinions, causes, and 
recommendations about a mishap (Dept. of Navy 2001).  Information that is voluntarily 
provided during a mishap investigation under a promise of confidentiality, or information 
which would not have been discovered but for voluntarily disclosures provided under a 
promise of confidentiality, is considered privileged information.  The analyses of 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the MIB in the MIR are also cons idered 
privileged information.  Also privileged are calculations and deductions the MIB makes 
that would reveal the board’s deliberative process.  Mishaps investigation report 
endorsements (MIREs) are also part of the deliberative process and are similarly 
privileged against disclosure (Dept. of Navy 2001).  Failure to properly handle or 
safeguard privileged information can result in disciplinary action.    
4.  Special Handling Requirements for NSC Data 
In obtaining the raw data from the NSC, the author was requested to signed a 
Statement of Understanding stating that he understood the following: 
1. The data/reports I have requested may contain privileged information. 
2. Unauthorized disclosure of privileged information by military personnel is 
a criminal offense under Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
3. Unauthorized disclosure of privileged information by civilian government 
personnel will subject them to disciplinary action under Civilian Personnel 
Instruction 752. 
4. No names (commands, ships, or individuals) may be used in my 
work/product (thesis, paper, study, etc.) if attributed to this data/report. 
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5. A copy of my final work/product (thesis, paper, study, etc.) will be 
provided to the Naval Safety Center, Code 30 to be used for safety 
awareness of the U.S. Navy. 
6. I will not release this information to the public or media. 
7. All information provided to me will be used only for safety purposes. 
8. Further release of this information by me is controlled by OPNAVINST 
5100.19D, 2001.  
9. If my finished work/product (thesis, paper, study, etc.) is to be published, I 
will provide a copy to the Naval Safety Center for approval prior to 
publication. 
This study is based on data that falls under the concept of privilege.  However, 
this report has been written in such a way that it contains no privileged information. 
5. METOC Information in Afloat and Aviation Mishap Reports 
The requirements for reporting METOC phenomena and operations associated 
with afloat mishaps are very general, and do not specifically require or prompt the 
reporters to provide detailed METOC information.  The afloat safety bible (Dept. of 
Navy 2001) simply states that weather conditions should be reported (e.g., temperature, 
relative humidity, visibility, lighting, ventilation, air quality, wind speed, sea state, 
current, tide, wind direction, precipitation, lightning, ducting, hurricane, and other).  In 
practice, most afloat mishap reports contain only general narrative descriptions, and 
perhaps a few observations, of METOC phenomena.  The afloat safety bible does not 
require any specific METOC phenomena to be reported.  Nor does it require the use of 
clearly defined METOC terms, or the consistent use of those terms in all afloat mishap 
reports.  Finally, the afloat safety bible does not require that METOC qualified personnel 
be involved in the investigation or reporting of mishaps, even mishaps that clearly 
involve METOC phenomena, METOC operations, and/or METOC affected operations. 
This study was prompted in part by Cantu’s (2001) analyses of Naval aviation 
mishap records.  We anticipated being able to conduct similar analyses, but were 
surprised to find that the requirements for reporting METOC phenomena and operations 
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are much more lax for Naval afloat mishaps than for Naval aviation mishaps.  When an 
aviation mishap occurs, many details of the associated METOC phenomena, METOC 
operations, and METOC affected operations are reported (e.g., quantitative observations 
of winds, clouds, visibility; specifics about the METOC forecast and briefs provided to 
the operators; details about how the operators prepared for the briefed METOC 
conditions.  The reporting forms used in the investigation of aviation mishaps prompt the 
reporter to provide information on many METOC aspects of the mishaps, including 
METOC phenomena, METOC operations, and METOC affected operations (Figures 2 
and 3).  This detailed information allows more detailed analyses to be conducted of the 
METOC aspects of aviation mishaps than of afloat mishaps (cf. Cantu 2001). 
B. METHODS 
1. Selection of Study Period and Basic Analysis Procedures 
When we began this study in summer 2001, afloat mishap records were available 
only in hard copy form for mishaps that occurred prior to March 1997.  We chose to 
conduct our study for the period for which NSC was able to provide records in electronic 
format, March 1997 – March 2002.  During this period, there were approximately 8000 
afloat mishaps.  The lack of detailed and consistently used terms for reporting METOC 
phenomena, METOC operations, and METOC affected operations made it difficult to 
sort the reports using word searches or similar methods.  So each report was read one at a 
time to determine if the mishap was METOC related. 
The METOC phenomena that were described in the MRs and MIRs were 
generally described with a few words (e.g., high seas, high seas and high winds, fog, 
etc.).  The most commonly used descriptions of METOC phenomena are listed below.  
These descriptions are grouped into the seven categories that we used to sort the mishaps 
according to the METOC phenomena with which they were associated. 
1. High Winds and Seas 
a. High Seas 
b. High Seas and High Winds 
c. High Seas, High Winds, and Rain 
14 





d. Humidity  
e. Drizzle 
f. High Winds, Rain, and Snow 
4. Ice and Snow 
a. Ice 
b. Snow 
c. Ice and snow 
5. Tropical Cyclone 
6. Tide 
7. Fog 
2.  Identification of METOC Related Mishaps (MRMs) 
I analyzed all afloat mishaps during the study period (March 1997 – March 2002) 
to identify those that were METOC related mishaps (MRMs).  In a MRM, METOC 
phenomena, and/or problems in METOC operations or METOC affected operations, 
contributed to the mishap.  Examples of mishaps in which METOC phenomena 
contributed to a mishap include those in which METOC conditions (e.g., high winds or 
heavy seas) directly and significantly increased the hazards to operators and/or 
equipment. 
Examples of problems in METOC operations that contributed to a mishap include 
those in which there was a: 
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1. breakdown in METOC related ORM process 
2. lack of training, understanding, and/or competence 
3. lack of real time forecast 
4. lack of MET team and/or brief 
5. breakdown in communications between METOC and Afloat personnel 
Problems in METOC affected operations that contributed to the MRMs include 
procedural and human factors.  The human factors can be broken down into the following 
categories and examples: 
1. Unsafe acts (e.g., operator acted without properly accounting for METOC 
phenomena)  
2. Unsafe supervision (e.g., supervisor did not ensure proper training and/or 
did not properly review conduct of operator) 
3. Unsafe crew conditions (e.g., overloading a small boat for the given sea 
state) 
4. Organizational influence (e.g., perceived urgency of evolution led 
organization to proceed without getting appropriate input to the ORM 
process from METOC personnel) 
Here is an example of a MRM in which METOC related human factors were the 
primary cause of the mishap.  Heavy seas were forecast for an amphibious exercise.  The 
exercise commander set the course and speed for one of the ships in a manner that did not 
allow one of the ships to make adjustments in a timely manner to achieve the best ride.  
The ship took severe rolls due to the high seas, and equipment broke loose and caused 
injuries and damage.  In this case, the heavy seas were forecast, but the operators and 
their supervisors failed to properly prepare for them by allowing timely adjustments in 
the ship’s course and speed.  The operators also failed to properly manage the METOC 
risks by rigging the ship for the heavy seas in accordance with its heavy weather bill.  
The concept of heavy weather, and the basic procedures to be followed in order to 
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manage heavy weather risks, are discussed in Dept. of Navy (2001a, chapter C16) and in 
Table 4. 




C1601.  DISCUSSION 
 
a. Heavy weather is any weather condition that results in high winds, extreme sea 
states, and heavy rain, snow and/or hail. 
b. There are multitudes of hazards present in heavy weather. Objects can slide or 
fall on personnel, causing injury. Personnel can fall into machinery or equipment. 
All personnel must be aware of potential hazards and safety requirements. 
 
C1602.  LIFELINES 
 
a. Keep lifelines or rails rigged at all times along all boundaries. Keep permanent 
lifelines in good repair. 
b. Keep unguarded openings adjacent life rail or lifeline sections or an end section 
and adjacent structures to a minimum and in no case greater than 5 inches. 
 
C1603.  TIE-DOWNS 
 
a. Use approved tie -downs or lashing to secure moveable shipboard items, such as 
aircraft, vehicles and cargo, against the motion of the ship and exposed areas 
against the forces of wind and waves. 
b. Seize or tie -down shackles, hooks, turnbuckles, release devices to prevent 
working loose. Check them for security more frequently in heavy weather. 
 
C1604.  SAFETY PRECAUTIONS UNDER HEAVY WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
a. Be aware of stowage locations of all equipment necessary for rigging heavy 
weather lifelines. 
b. Inspect tie -down equipment such as cables, turnbuckles, deck pads and bolts, at 
frequent intervals to ensure their security. 
c. Only use the fittings provided on the aircraft, vehicle, and equipment to be 
transported to secure the item to the ship. 
d. Do not use excessive force to place a tie -down onto a fitting. 
e. Ensure that the arrangement of individual tie -down assemblies is in strict 
conformance with design requirements. 




The determination of which MIRs and MRs were MRMs was based on what we 
call the Practical Man Test (PMT, Figure 4).  In the PMT, three main questions were 
asked: 
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1. Would the mishap have happened in a benign environment? 
2. Would the mishap have happened if an accurate METOC forecast and 
brief had been provided at the proper stage in the ORM process? 
3. Would the mishap have happened if appropriate procedures for dealing 
with METOC phenomena had been followed? 
If the answer to question 1 was “no”, the mishap was considered to be a MRM.  If 
the answer to question 1 was “yes” or “maybe”, question 2 was asked.  If the answer to 
question 2 was “no”, the mishap was considered to be a MRM.  If the answer to question 
2 was “yes” or “maybe”, question 3 was asked.  If the answer to question 3 was “yes” or 
“maybe”, then the mishap was considered to not be a MRM.The answers to the PMT 
questions were made by the author and were based on his Naval experience as: (1) a 
qualified Surface Warfare Officer (SWO), qualified both topside and in engineering; (2) a 
qualified METOC Officer; and (3) a Qualified Afloat Safety Officer.  For mishaps in 
which the answers to the PMT questions were not clear, other Naval officers with 
comparable qualifications were asked for second opinions. 
The application of the PMT to the full set of afloat MIRs and MRs led initially to 
the identification of 263 MRMs.  These 263 mishaps were then examined a second time.  
This examination was conducted with the assistance of other qualified Surface Warfare 
and METOC officers to make the final determination of whether a mishap was a MRM or 
not (see Acknowledgments).  After these analyses, the total number of MRMs was 
reduced to 166, or roughly 2 percent of the total set of 8000 MIRs and MRs.  However 
this 2 percent is a misleading number, as is explained in the following paragraph.  
Most of the MIRs and MRs contained little information about METOC 
phenomena, METOC operations, and/or METOC affected operations.  Much of the 
information that was provided was vague and non-quantitative.  This lack of information 
made it impossible for most mishaps to determine whether or not they were METOC 
related.  Thus, we were not able to determine the actual percentage of mishaps that were 
MRMs.  Similar problems occurred in the reporting of damages and injuries.  Many of 
the MIRs and MRs contained too little information to accurately determine the costs of 
equipment damage or the extent of personal injuries.  Thus, we were not able to 
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determine the true costs of the mishaps, and in particular the MRMs.  These problems 
with missing data are discussed further in Chapter IV. 
3. Development of METOC Related Mishap Database 
A database containing the specifics of all the MRMs was constructed using 
Microsoft Access as the platform.  The database was set up to incorporate as much 
information from the MRs and MIRs as possible.  The following is a list of the database 
fields:  
1. Day 
2. Time  
3. Month  
4. Year 
5. Mishap Date 
6. Mishap Time 
7. Ship Hull Number  
8. Unit Identification Code 
9. Evolution At Time Of Mishap 
10. Mishap type 
11. Mishap Class 
12. On/Off Duty 
13. On/Off Ship 
14. Human Error 
15. Human Error Type 
16. Would Have Happened Without Element 
17. Personnel Type 
18. Lost Days of Work 
19. Light Duty Days 
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20. Disability  
21. Equipment Damaged 
22. Equipment Type 
23. Equipment Cost 
24. Environmental Element 
25. Tropical Cyclone data 
26. Forecast Available 
27. Brief Given 
28. Forecast Believed 
29. Disseminated  
30. Risk Assessed 
31 Risk Assessment Believed 
32. Missing Input From MIR 
33. Comment Box  
Once this database for the 166 MRMs was completed, we were able to conduct a 
number of analyses (e.g., to identify and analyze the circumstances of the MRMs that 
were associated with a tropical cyclone).  Some of these analyses required the use of 
additional information; for example, the use of best track TC data from the Joint Typhoon 
Warning Center (JTWC) and the National Hurricane Center (NHC).  The results of these 


























We identified 166 Class A, B, and C afloat MRMs during our 5-year study period 
(March 1997 March 2002).  This compares to 11% of the Class A aviation mishaps found 
by Cantu (2001).  Figure 5 shows the breakdown of the afloat MRMs by mishap class.  
Most of the MRMs were Class C mishaps. 
B. COSTS OF MRMS 
The costs of the 166 MRMs were significant (Figures 6 – 11).  A total of 7 
crewmembers were killed during the 5-years, for an average of 1.5 deaths per year (Fig 
6).  There were 132 MRMs (80% of the total number of MRMs) that led to personal 
injuries (Figure 7).  Most of these were Class C mishaps. 
There were 79 MRMs that involved equipment damage.  The cost of this damage 
over the 5 years was approximately $9 million.  This represents 79 MRMs at an average 
cost of $54,200 per event.  Figure 8 shows the average MRM damage cost for each 
mishap class.  
There was a total number of 2,707 lost work days during the study period for all 
classes of MRMs (Figure 9), for an average of 540 lost duty days per year.  The average 
MRM led to 16 days of lost duty.  The 166 MRMs led to 1,757 light duty days (Figure 
10), for an average of 350 light duty days per year.  The average MRM led to 11 days of 
light duty.  Thus, the average MRM during the study period led to: (1) 26 days of light or 
lost duty; and (2) 2.5 people per day on light or lost duty status. 
This summary of the personal injury costs does not fully account for all the lost 
and light duty days, since a number of the MIRs and MRs were filed before the full costs 
had accrued.  This summary also does not account for the costs of medical care, wages 
paid to people who were unable to perform their duties, and other costs that are not 
documented in the MIRs and MRs.   
C. OPERATIONS, VESSELS, AND PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN MRMS 
The MRMs were categorized according to the type of operation (type of 
evolution) that was being conducted when the mishap occurred.  The four operation 
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categories are: (1) underway, (2) moored, (3) privately owned vehicle (POVs), and (4) 
liberty.  Because of limited or missing input data in the MIRs and MRs, the underway 
category could not be into sub-categories, such as replenishment or formation steaming.  
Moored is defined as any time the ship is secured in a berth or at anchor.  The POV 
category describes situations in which a crewmember was operating a personal vehicle 
while on duty or while in transit to or from work.  Liberty is defined as any time a 
crewmember is off duty and free to pursue personal activities.   
Figure 12 shows the number of MRMs per operation types.  Most (70%) of the 
MRMs involved shipboard operations, with underway operations having 83 MRMs and 
moored accounting for 34 MRMs.  41 (25%) of the MRMs involved POV operations.  
The underway and moored MRMs involved almost every type of vessel in the U.S. Navy 
(Figure 13), with carriers accounting for the most MRMs, 34.  Carriers also accounted for 
the largest number of MRMs with personal injuries, 25, and equipment costs of 
$3,700,000 (not shown). 
The numbers in Figure 13 include MRMs involving small boats that were 
associated with the types of ships listed in Figure 13.  Figure 14 shows that small boat 
MRMs accounted for 13 or 8% of all MRMs.  10 of these 13 mishaps involved rigid hull 
inflatable boats (RHIBs).  These boats are relatively lightweight, have shallow keels and 
a shallow draft, and are capable of high speeds and tight maneuvers.  Figure 15 shows 
some of the costs of small boat MRMs.  Small boat lost duty days accounted for 14% of 
the total number of MRM lost duty days, and 22 % of the MRM total of light duty days.  
Small boat MRMs led to total of 750 lost and light duty days, or an average of 150 lost or 
light duty days per year.  Thus, small boat MRMs account for a disproportionate number 
of lost and light duty days, indicating that these types of mishaps are especially 
dangerous.  These results also suggest that there are significant shortcomings in the 
METOC related ORM process for small boat operations (e.g., shortcomings in training 
and briefing for small boat operations under adverse METOC conditions).  
Most of the MRMs (70%) occurred while the personnel involved were on-duty 
(not shown).  The costs associated with POV operations were high.  POV MRMs led to 3 
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deaths, 257 lost duty days, 429 light duty days, and 15% of the total number of lost and 
light duty days (Figure 16). 
28, or 17%, of the MRMs involved officers and 135 or 82% involved enlisted 
personnel.  These proportions are roughly similar to the proportions of total officers and 
enlisted personnel in the Navy.  
D. LOCATION AND TIME OF MRMS 
The authors of MIRs and MRs are requested to provide the geographic location 
(e.g., latitude and longitude, or port).  The locations of the MRMs are shown in Figure 
17.  The greatest concentration of MRMs was along the east coast of the U.S. where a 
great deal of afloat Naval activity occurs, and where severe storms (e.g., midlatitude 
cyclones in the winter, tropical cyclones in the summer) are common.  Figure 17 also 
shows concentrations of MRMs in other areas of high Naval activity, including: the west 
and Gulf of Mexico coasts of the U.S., the Mediterranean Sea, the western Pacific, and 
the Arabian Gulf.  Note from Figure 17 that 5 MRMs could not be located due to 
incomplete information in the mishap records.  Similar geographic clustering of the 
MRMs is found when the MRM locations are plotted according to mishap class and type 
of operation (not shown). 
The local times at which MRMs occurred were about evenly split between day 
and night times (55% during the day and 45% at night; not shown).  This may indicate 
that Naval personnel tend to be most active during the day, but that low light levels at 
night create more hazardous conditions.  Most (71%) of the MRMs occurred during the 
northern winter and spring (not shown).  This may be a result of high winter storm 
activity, and snowy and icy conditions, in the regions where the Navy is most active. 
E. METOC PHENOMENA ASSOCIATED WITH MRMS 
According to the information about METOC phenomena provided in the MIRs 
and MRs, 76 (46%) of the MRMs involved high winds and/or high seas (Fig 18).  Rain 
was involved in 61 (37%) of the MRMs.  Other types of phenomena were involved in the 
MRMs to a much smaller extent.  It is important to keep in mind however, that the MIRs 
and MRs provide only very limited information about phenomena.  Nonetheless, the 
results shown in Figure 18 raise the following questions for the METOC community.  Is 
accurate METOC information about high wind and sea conditions being properly 
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communicated to afloat users?  If it is, is the information not being understood?  If it is 
being understood, is there a breakdown in the ORM process for dealing with high winds, 
seas, and rain? 
The MIRs and MRs indicated that only 5 afloat mishaps during the study period 
involved tropical cyclones (TCs).  However, since many of the MIRs and MRs gave only 
limited information about METOC phenomena, we conducted a more in depth analysis of 
all 166 MRMs to identify all that were TC related.  We did this by comparing the 
locations and times of the mishaps with TC best track data from JTWC (for the western 
Pacific and Indian Ocean basins) and NHC (for the North Atlantic and eastern North 
Pacific basins).  This analysis revealed that a total of 15, or 9%, of the 166 MRMs were 
TC related (Figure 19).  8 of these occurred in the North Atlantic, where Naval activity is 
high, and 5 occurred in the western North Pacific, where TC activity is high and Naval 
activity is relatively high (McBride 1995).  Two of the TC related MRMs that occurred in 
the North Atlantic during 1999 were associated with one TC, Hurricane Floyd, which 
moved poleward along the east coast of the U.S. during September 1999.  The MIRs and 
MRs did not provide evidence of any TC related MRMs in the Indian or eastern North 
Pacific basins.  Figure 20 shows the total number of TC related mishaps per year.  Note 
the overall declining trend, from 6 TC related mishaps in 1997 to zero in 2001.  This 
trend may be an indication of the improvements in TC track forecasting for both the 
western Pacific and North Atlantic basins (Jeffries and Fukada 2002; M. Boothe, 2002, 
personal communication).  Additional analyses of TC related mishaps prior to and after 
our study period could help clarify the changes in TC related mishaps and provide a 
measure (i.e., a metric) of METOC contributions to afloat operations.  Such studies 
should be designed to determine and compare the year-to-year variations in TC activity, 
Naval afloat activity, and TC track forecasting skill.  
F. METOC OPERATIONS AND METOC AFFECTED OPERATIONS 
ASSOCIATED WITH MRMS 
One of the objectives of our study was to determine to what extent afloat mishaps 
were associated with: (1) adverse METOC phenomena; (2) deficiencies in METOC 
operations; and/or (3) deficiencies in METOC affected operations.  The occurrence of 
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either of the two operational deficiencies would indicate a breakdown in the ORM 
process used to assess and manage METOC hazards. 
We determined that 123, or 74%, of the 166 MRMs would not have happened in a 
benign environment (Figure 21).  Thus, in these mishaps, we concluded that adverse 
METOC phenomena were primary contributors to the mishap.  We also concluded that 
26% of the MRMs occurred without METOC phenomena making a primary contribution.  
In these mishaps, operational problems were the primary contributor to the mishap, with 
METOC phenomena not being involved or making a secondary contribution to the 
mishap.  In many of these cases, METOC operations and/or METOC affected operations 
led to the mishap, but the mishap was exacerbated by adverse METOC conditions.  An 
example of such a mishap is given in the following paragraph. 
During a mooring evolution, a ship had too much speed for the current and struck 
the pier.  This mishap would have happened without any current, due to the ship’s 
excessive speed.  However, the presence of the current increased the damage.  This 
mishap was mainly due to two operational problems: (1) lack of appropriate METOC 
forecast and brief; and (2) failure to follow appropriate procedures for the METOC 
conditions.  Problem 2 is an example of a deficiency in METOC operations and indicates 
a failure in the METOC related ORM process.  Problem 2 is an example of a deficiency 
in METOC affected operations.  Thus, the primary causes of this mishap were 
operational, not phenomenological. 
Figure 22 shows the number of MRMs for which a METOC forecast was 
provided for the operation in which the mishap occurred.  For 33 of the MRMs, it was 
clear whether a forecast had been provided (25 MRMs had a forecast, 8 did not).  The 
lack of METOC information in the MIRs and MRs prevented the author from 
determining whether a forecast was provided for the vast majority of the MRMs (133 out 
of 166).  These determinations were based in part on the documentation provided in the 
MIRs, and in part on the author’s Naval experience and qualifications (see chapter 2). 
We also investigated whether a METOC brief was provided for the operations in 
which a MRM occurred.  The answers to this question are shown in Figure 23.  As with 
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the METOC forecast issue (Figure 22), in most cases it was unclear whether a brief had 
been provided to the operators.   
For only 20 of the MRMs were we able to determine that the operators followed 
appropriate procedures for dealing with the METOC conditions under which they were 
operating (Figure 24).  Of the 166 MRMs, 139, or 84%, involved some sort of deficiency 
in training on how to assess, manage, and/or operate in adverse METOC phenomena 
(Figure 25).  Examples of these deficiencies include: lack of training in determining wave 
heights; inadequate supervision of personnel who are going to be operating in adverse 
METOC conditions; and lack of training on how to operate a small boat in high seas. 
The lack of information in afloat MIRs and MRs about forecasts and briefs is in 
sharp contrast to the case for aviation MIRs and MRs (cf. Cantu 2001).  This, of course, 
makes it much more difficult to identify for afloat mishaps what METOC operational 
deficiencies existed, and how METOC products and services could be improved in the 
future.  However, for certain types of mishaps, supplemental information may be used to 
assess value of METOC products and services.  For example, the use of supplemental 
information about TC activity and TC forecasts may be used to clarify the METOC 
aspects of TC related mishaps.  Also, the use of optimal track ship routing (OTSR) 
information may be used to supplement mishap records and provide a better description 
of the value of METOC products and services, as shown by Hinz (2002). 
G.  CASE STUDIES 
In this section, we present four case studies that illustrate the various ways in 
which problems in METOC related ORM can lead to mishaps and a loss of readiness (see 
Figure 1).  These cases also provide specific examples of lessons for the METOC 
community on how to better contribute to afloat operations.  One of the benefits of case 
studies is that they can help clarify the overall operational context in which MRMs occur. 
1. Case 1 
A moored carrier was preparing to conduct morning colors.  Ongoing deck work 
caused the color guard to proceed to the carrier’s island structure to raise the flag from 
the ship’s main mast.  While raising the flag, a wind gust exceeding 25 knots ripped the 
lanyard and flag from the crewmember’s hands.  The lanyard & flag became entangled in 
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a rotating radar antenna.  The results were $300,000 in equipment damage and a carrier 
that was unable to go to sea for 6 days. 
The main recommendations from the mishap report were: 
a. Conduct coordinated risk assessment & management (ORM) on hazards 
associated with raising the flag at alternate locations. 
b. Develop METOC guidelines for raising flag at alternate locations. 
c. Contact METOC office for METOC conditions and account for them 
when selecting flag size & location. 
d. Conduct training.   
This mishap report left many important questions, including: 
a. Did the Command Duty Officer know of the alternate location and 
METOC conditions? 
b. Was the Officer of the Deck provided with a weather report or brief? 
c. Was the color guard given a weather brief? 
d. Did the METOC office provide reports or briefs for these kinds of 
evolutions?   
e. What were the overall METOC conditions? 
This case shows how something as simple as raising a flag coupled with a 
hazardous METOC phenomena can grow into a major mishap.  METOC related training 
and METOC related ORM were clearly deficient in this case.  As with many other 
mishap messages, this case was under reported.  The absence of critical information for 
developing improved ORM makes it difficult to learn and disseminate lessons based on 
this mishap.  The results of this MRM indicate, as many do, that the reports and 
recommendations from MRMs should be developed in conjunction with METOC 
personnel. 
2. Case 2 
A guided missile cruiser was independent steaming in the Mediterranean Sea.  
The ship requested OTSR in its Movement Report (MOVREP).  The ship encountered a 
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winter storm with winds of 50 - 65 kts, seas 12 – 18 ft, low visibility, heavy precipitation, 
and lightning.  Poor weather conditions caused extensive equipment damage and 
prevented the ship from entering port on schedule.  The ship stated that weather 
information was not available in a timely manner.  The result was $30,000 in equipment 
damage.  The mishap report authors recommended that: 
a. The ship should have rigged for heavy weather. 
b. The ship should have reviewed it’s heavy weather bill and planned for 
unexpected severe weather. 
c. Up-to-date and tailored weather information should be available in the 
Mediterranean.  
d. The ship should ensure that its long-range training plan general military 
training (GMT) cover heavy weather rigging, storm avoidance, and 
meteorological products & procedures. 
The mishap report provide no indication of: 
a. What METOC products if any were used by the navigator to plan the 
ship’s course through the storm. 
b.  Whether the ship received a warning and forecast from METOC Rota via 
MRSAT call or JOTS OPNOTE. 
c. What pre-deployment training on heavy weather operations & METOC 
product availability were provided to the ship’s company. 
d. The initial report did not indicate that METOC Rota informed the ship that 
OTSR was unavailable for the Med. 
This case clearly illustrates a breakdown in communication between the METOC 
community and its customers aboard the ship, especially about what METOC products 
and services were available for the Mediterranean. 
3. Case 3 
A guided missile cruiser was independent steaming during a tropical cyclone 
evasion.  Heavy seas from the tropical cyclone causes a pallet truck to break free from its 
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stowage position allowing it to roll freely back and forth, causing equipment and 
structural damage.  This ship’s force proceeded to secure the pallet truck with the 
overhead chain fall to the battery lifting bar on top of the pallet truck.  The ship 
experience a severe roll, causing the bar to break free and strike one of the crewmembers 
in the head, knocking him unconscious.  The result was a head injury that caused 7 lost 
work days and $5000 in equipment damage.  The mishap report contained no 
recommendations for avoiding this type of mishap in the future. 
This mishap report left out many pieces of information that are vital in evaluating 
the METOC aspects of the mishap, including: 
a. Did the ship receive a METOC forecast and/or brief? 
b. Was the ship rigged for heavy weather? 
c.  Was the ship on the right course for the best ride? 
d. Did the ship follow its heavy weather bill? 
4. Case 4 
While conducting maritime boarding operations in the Arabian Gulf, a ship’s 
RHIB was positioned alongside a merchant vessel.  The RHIB was taking on water from 
heavy seas and water flowing off the deck of the merchant vessel.  The RHIB coxswain 
was maintaining position, when the RHIB was caught by a large oncoming wave and 
lifted up into the face of the wave.  Water that had collected in the RHIB rushed back 
toward the stern.  The free surface effect of the rushing water combined with the force of 
the oncoming wave caused the RHIB to capsize.  The result was $15,000 in equipment 
damage and 40 operating days lost. 
The main recommendations from the mishap report were: 
a. Training in adverse weather conditions and varying sea states will help 
enable boat crew to better compensate for difficult boating maneuvers. 
b. Real world missions often require operating in less than ideal conditions.  
Proper qualifications are of utmost importance, and the fact that all 
personnel involved were PQS qualified and had trained to this mission, 
doubtless played a significant role in preventing injury and/or loss of life. 
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The report for this mishap also left out important information for evaluating 
METOC issues, including answers to these questions: 
a. Did the ship receive a METOC forecast and/or brief? 
b. Did the RHIB crew receive a METOC brief prior to the evolution? 
c. Did the ship request the merchant vessel to steer into the best seas for best 
ride? 
The major conclusions that can be drawn from these case studies are 
representative of those found in many of the MRMs.  These include the following. 
a. Seemingly minor phenomena can have major negative consequences. 
b. METOC information needs to brought into ORM early and used 
throughout the ORM process.  
c. Training on how to conduct METOC affected operations under adverse 
METOC conditions appears to be deficient for many types of METOC 
phenomena and many evolutions. 
d. Mishap reports leave out a great deal of information, especially 
information about: (1) the specific evolutions being conducted during the 
mishap; (2) METOC phenomena and operations; and (3) how the ORM 
process for the evolution was affected by METOC information (e.g., by a 
forecast or brief). 
e. The recommendations and lessons to be learned from mishaps need to be 
developed in conjunction with METOC personnel.  
These and many other cases also provide several specific lessons for the METOC 
community, in particular: 
a. Be sure METOC customers are aware of and understand what METOC 
products and services are available for their operational areas and 
evolutions.  
b. Know the customers’ missions and limitations.  Take the initiative and 
anticipate their needs.  
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c. Solicit more complete feedback from customers involved in MRMs. 
d. Establish a routine process for using mishap reports as a tool for 
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IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES AND RESULTS 
In this study, we used Naval afloat mishap reports to identify MRMs, the METOC 
phenomena that occurred during the mishaps, and the operational conditions under which 
the mishaps occurred.  8000 afloat MIRs and MRs from March 1997 – March 2002 were 
reviewed.  Most contained relatively little METOC information, even in very well written 
afloat MRs and MIRs, and even for mishaps that were clearly METOC related.  37 or 
22% of the 166 MRs provided less than the minimal amount of required METOC 
information.  Most reports that provided the minimum METOC information still did not 
provide enough to fully analyze the METOC phenomena or METOC related operation.  
Thus, it was difficult to determine the complete circumstances of the mishaps and their 
full costs. 
Our major findings for the MRMs we identified during the study period are listed 
below: 
1. We were able to determine that 166 mishaps were MRMs.  For most 
mishaps, there was too little METOC information to determine whether or 
not they were MRMs. 
2. The MRMs caused 7 deaths. 
3. The MRMs caused $9,000,000 in equipment damage. 
4. The MRMs led to 2707 lost work days. 
5. The MRMs led to 1757 light duty work days. 
6. Shipboard operations accounted for 70% of MRMs. 
7. 25% of the MRMs involved POVs. 
8. POVs account for 15% of lost or light duty days. 
9. Carriers were involved in more MRMs than any other vessel type, and 
accounted for 15% of the total MRM personal injuries. 
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10. MRMs during small boat operations accounted for 8% of all MRMs, 14% 
of the MRM lost duty days, 22% of the MRM light duty days. 
11. Small boat MRMs had a very high labor cost: over 750 days of lost or 
light duty. 
12. 70% of all MRMs occurred while on duty. 
13. 81% of the MRMs involved enlisted personnel. 
14. 55% of MRMs occurred during the daytime. 
15. 71% of the MRMs occurred in the winter and spring months. 
16. Major phenomena: high wind and seas accounted for 46% of the MRMs.  
17. Rain accounted for 37% of POV mishaps. 
18. 9% of the MRMs were tropical cyclone related. 
19. In 74% of the MRMs, METOC phenomena were a primary contributor.  
20. For 80% of the MRMs, it was not known if a METOC forecast was 
provided to the operators.  
21. For 86% of the MRMs, we were not able to determine if a METOC brief 
was provided to the operators.  
22. For 88% of the MRMs, we were not able to determine if the operators 
followed appropriate procedures for dealing with the METOC phenomena. 
23. 84% of all MRMs involve some type of training issue. 
24. 22% of the 166 MRs provided less than the minimal amount of METOC 
information. 
Our findings indicate that Naval Safety Center’s MIRs and MRs can be a valuable 
tool in developing METOC metrics, but more complete mishap records would be much 
more useful to both the Afloat and METOC communities.  
B. CHALLENGES  
The system for reporting afloat mishaps, and the lack of clear information about 
METOC phenomena, METOC operations, and METOC affected operations, presented 
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many challenges during this study.  We found that many afloat mishaps are under-
reported.  That is, the reports on these mishaps do not give a full accounting of the nature 
of the mishaps or their true costs.  Based on the author’s Naval experience and 
discussions with other officers with similar experience, it appears that under-reporting is 
done in order to: 
1. Understate the true costs (e.g., in personnel injury, equipment damage, lost 
labor, lost dollars, etc.)  
2. Minimize or diffuse responsibility for the mishaps.   
3. Protect careers. 
It also appears that some mishaps go unreported (i.e., not reported all).  It also 
appears that the true costs of under-reported or unreported mishaps may sometimes be 
hidden within general operating expenses. 
Many of these under-reporting and non-reporting problems may be linked to the 
culture of the surface Navy.  The U.S. Navy surface culture is steeped in a rich history 
that dates back to John Paul Jones (1747-1792), who stated, “It seems to be a truth, 
inflexible and inexorable, that he who will not risk cannot win.”  The surface culture 
today still holds these words true.  This leads to a surface culture in which people: 
1. are reluctant to say no to taking on risks  
2. try to accomplish more with the same or fewer resources 
3. try to accomplish missions in spite of high costs and big risks 
4. are inclined to stick with the old ways of doing business because that’s the 
way it’s always been done 
5. accept losses as simply the cost of doing business  
Understanding this culture will help the METOC community understand what the 
core values of its afloat customers are.  This, in turn should help the METOC community 
identify its own core values and determine how best to proceed in providing METOC 




Based on the results of this study, we have developed a number of specific 
recommendations for the METOC, afloat, and safety communities regarding the METOC 
aspects of afloat risk management, safety, and readiness.  
1. Improve METOC products and services so that they: 
a. better meet customer needs and constraints (e.g., make WEAX 
messages easier to read and understand) 
b. are more operation specific  
c. provide information critical for ORM 
2. Improve education and training for METOC and the fleet on assessing and 
managing METOC risks (METOC ORM).  This includes improving and 
developing new training modules on how to operate under adverse 
METOC conditions.  See below for a training module that has resulted 
from this study for teaching small boat operators how to assess and 
manage METOC risks (Martin and Murphree 2002).  The United 
Kingdom’s Royal Naval School of Seamanship may be provide some 
good models for integrating METOC information into training methods 
and materials for both the METOC and the afloat communities (see: 
http://royal-navy.mod.uk/rn). 
3. Modify mishap investigation reporting to include increased METOC 
information & other information that would help METOC community 
improve its products & services (e.g., more information about ORM, 
evolution, training, etc.).  Mishap reporting by aviation community may be 
a good model to follow.  See below for the METOC information that we 
will recommend to NSC be included in future afloat mishap MIRs and 
MRs. 
4. Detail METOC officer to work with NSC staff on identification and 
analysis of METOC related reports. 
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5. Identify METOC related mishaps as soon as possible so the METOC 
community can enter them into the MRM database along with relevant 
METOC data (e.g., METOC analyzed fields, forecasts, and briefs for the 
mishaps). 
6. Have FNMOC and other METOC regional center archive METOC fields 
for time and place of MRMs. 
7. Disseminate the MRM database to METOC and afloat communities for 
additional analyses. 
D. TRAINING 
A training module for RHIB operators, Martin and Murphree (2002) has been 
developed as a by-product of this study.  This module provides instruction on assessing 
and managing METOC risks when planning and conducting RHIB operations under 
various sea states.  The module is a quick, hands-on guide for estimating seas and 
identifying parameters for safe operations.  This product should be especially useful 
when METOC information from a mobile-team or OA Division is not available.  This 
module will be delivered to the fleet through the Surface Warfare Officer School 
(SWOS) Department Head Training Program in Newport, RI.  The United Kingdom’s 
Royal Naval School of Seamanship may be provide some good models for integrating 
METOC information into training methods and materials for both the METOC and the 
afloat communities (Moys 2002, Royal Navy 2002). 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS TO NSC 
We have recommended to NSC that the following items of information, and 
answers to the following questions, be included in future afloat MIRs and MRs. 
What were the METOC conditions immediately prior to and during the mishap?  
Please provide quantitative information about: true and relative wind direction and speed, 
visibility, current, tide, temperature, and sea state category. 
In the opinion of the mishap report author, did METOC phenomena or METOC 




1. What type of METOC products and services did the ship receive? 
2. What was the source of the ship’s METOC products and services?  
3. Was a METOC forecast provided? 
4. Was a METOC brief provided? 
5. Were the forecast and/or brief understood? 
6. Was the METOC information disseminated properly? 
7. What METCO related ORM was conducted prior, during, and after the 
mishap? 
8. What evolution as occurring immediately before and during the mishap? 
9. What were the vessel’s limits, and did it exceed its limits? 
10. What training was received by, and what was the experience of, operators 
in dealing with the METOC conditions that existed immediately prior to 
and during the mishap? 
F. ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
The major accomplishments of this study are: (1) the development of a database 
of METOC related mishaps used in this and an OTSR study (Hinz 2002) and useful for 
future studies; (2) the development of recommendations for the METOC, Afloat, and 
Safety communities; (3) the development of a baseline data set for quantifying future 
contributions of METOC community to Naval afloat risk management, safety, and 
readiness; and (4) the identification of the need for, and the development of, a METOC 
related training module for the Afloat community (Martin 2002). 
G. FUTURE WORK 
As in many studies like this one, we have perhaps come up with more questions 
than we have answered.  To address these questions, we recommend that the following 
projects be pursued in future work. 
1. Work with CDR Doug Marble, FNMOC, on applying search and rescue 
(SAR) display system to METOC impacts on ship handling. 
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2. Develop metrics to quantify hours lost/saved and the dollars lost/saved due 
to METOC phenomena and operations. 
3. Identify how improvements in TC forecasting may have saved lives and 
dollars. 
4. Disseminate the results of this study, for example through METOC, 
Safety, and other publications (e.g., CNMOC News, Fathom, Naval 
Institute Proceedings).  
5. Examine aviation mishaps using methods developed in this study (e.g., 
PMT). 
6. Do aviation and afloat studies comparable to this one based on: 
a. OTSR records & reports 
b. Post-deployment reports 
c. Lessons learned reports 
7. Relate METOC phenomena to specific afloat operations and vessels.  For 
example, answer the following questions: 
a. How many deaths and injuries were associated with each METOC 
phenomenon? 
b. What phenomena were associated with what operations types?  For 
each operation type, what were the most problematic phenomena? 
c.  What phenomena were associated with what vessel types? 
d. For each vessel type, what were the most problematic phenomena? 
e. How much equipment damage was associated with each 
phenomenon? 
8. Relate specific METOC phenomena and operations to specific types of 
mishap and/or equipment damage that occurred in the MRMs. For 






e. equipment damaged after breaking loose for hold downs 
f. cable parting 
g. fouling 
h. entanglement 
9. Identify and analyze the METOC operations involved in the MRMs.  For 
example, determine how many MRMs were associated with: 
a. problems with including METOC in ORM 
b. forecasting deficiencies 
c. briefing deficiencies 
d. training deficiencies 
e. problems with adhering to METOC related SOP 
10. Calculate mishaps rates.  Examples:  calculate mishaps per crew members 
per vessel type 
11. Analyze more thoroughly costs associated with personal injuries 
a. account for pay rates of injured personnel. 
b. determine if Officer or Enlisted are disproportionately injured.  
12. As more detailed mishap reports become available, analyze the METOC 
phenomena and operations associated with specific underway operation 
types – for example: 
a. open ocean transit 
b. port or harbor entry/exit 
c. underway replenishment 
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d. small boat operations 
e. amphibious operations 
f. special operation 
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Figure 2.   Required METOC Information in Aviation Mishap Reports Part 1 
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MIRs & MRs Would mishap have happened
in a benign environment?  
This was an 
MRM
Would mishap have happened
if appropriate procedures for dealing with 
METOC phenomena had been followed? 
Would mishap have happened if accurate
METOC forecast and brief had been provided 
at the proper stage in the ORM process? 





Practical Man Test Flow Chart
 
Figure 4.   Practical Man Test Flow Chart 
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METOC Related Mishaps 
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A total of 7 crew members killed during the 5 years, for 
an average of 1.5 deaths per year
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Figure 6.   Deaths Due to METOC Related Mishaps 
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Average Damage Per METOC Related Mishap
For the 79 mishaps that involved equipment damage,
the total cost of the damage was $9 million. 









Total equipment damage 
over 5 years: $9 million.
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Figure 8.   Average Damage Per METOC Related Mishap 
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Lost Work Days Due to
METOC Related Mishaps 
Total lost work days over 5 years: 2707, 
for an average of 540 days per year.
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Light Duty Work Days Due to 
METOC Related Mishaps
Total light duty days over 5 years: 1757,
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Figure 10.   Light Duty Work Days Due to METOC Related Mishaps 
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Average Light & Lost Duty Days Per 
METOC Related Mishap
Total of 2.5 people on light or lost duty status on
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25% of METOC related mishaps involved POVs.
Half of all METOC related mishaps 
occurred during underway evolutions
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Vessels Involved in METOC Related Mishaps
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Small Boat METOC Related Mishaps 




Note: All of these mishaps were connected to 
ship-owned small boats.
13 (8%) of the 166 METOC related 
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Figure 14.   Small Boat METOC Related Mishaps 
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Impacts of Small Boat MRMs
Number of Deaths 0




Soft Tissue Damage 5
Lost Duty Days 381
Light Duty Days 378
Equipment Costs $15,000
Small boat mishaps have a very high labor cost: 
over 750 days of lost or light duty in last 5 years!
22% of  MRM total
14% of  MRM total
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Deaths and Light & Lost Duty Days
Due to POV METOC Related Mishaps
POV METOC related mishaps accounted for 3 deaths and
15% of the total number of light & lost days.
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Figure 16.   Deaths and Light & Lost Duty Days Due to POV MRMs 
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Location of METOC Related Mishaps
Chart created by  Ed Altimari
Geospatial Analyst
NIMA Support Team to Navy
 






















Major phenomena:  High winds/seas for all 
mishap classes; rain for POV mishaps.
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Tropical Cyclone Related Mishaps
Mishap reports identified only 5 TC related mishaps.
Best track TC data revealed that 15 (9%) of the 
166 MRMs were TC related. 
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Tropical Cyclone Related Mishaps
















97 98 99 00 01
Note declining trend during 1997 - 2001.                                                          
Evidence of TC forecast improvements?                           
Potential metric of METOC contributions?
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Figure 20.   Tropical Cyclone Related Mishaps Time Series 
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In 123 of the 166 METOC related mishaps 
(74%) hazardous environmental conditions 
were a primary contributor.
In 43 (26%) of the 166 MRMs, operational METOC problems
were a primary contributor to the mishap. METOC and Naval Afloat Operations:Risk Management, Safety, & Readiness
Thesis Research by LCDR Brett Martin, USN
Naval Postgraduate School
Advisors: Professors Tom Murphree and Chuck Wash
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For 133 (80%) of the 166 MRMs, we could
not determine if a forecast was provided.
 
Figure 22.   Was a Forecast Provided for METOC Related Mishap 
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For 143 (86%) of the 166 MRMs, we could
not determine if a brief was given. METOC and Naval Afloat Operations:Risk Management, Safety, & Readiness
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Were Appropriate Procedures Followed 
for Dealing With METOC Phenomena?
Number of Mishaps
0 50 100 150 200
20
146
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139 (or 84%) of the 166 mishaps involved 
inadequate training on how to assess, manage, 
and /or operate in adverse METOC phenomena.
Cost of training vs cost of not training 
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